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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The article researches the actual issues of developing partnership and cooperation 
between the state and private business in matters of production and modernization the 
military-industrial complex of Russia. The main object of the research is the Russian NAVY. 
The subject of the research is the comparison of the Russian and US NAVY modernization in 
the context of public and private partnership. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The authors used a wide range of methodological tools in 
the course of the study. The method of economic analysis, the method of structural analysis, 
the statistical method and the method of mathematical comparison were used. 
Findings. Studying the role of business actors in the national rearmament programmes in 
Russia the authors revealed such key indicators as economic viability and financial 
efficiency of programme implementation. A comparative analysis of budget and private 
funding of the similar US programme  was conducted and statistical data supporting the 
main findings of the study were introduced.  
Practical Implications: The development of cooperation between business and the MIC at 
the state level should go along the path of creating conditions for public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) - a set of organizational, legal, financial and economic relations and joint actions of 
the state and private business aimed at achieving the goals of the state economic policy in 
order to address socially significant tasks on mutually beneficial conditions. 
Originality/Value: The authors’ conclusion that state’s  financial   and   economic   policy   
in   the   field   of   defense  and modernization  of  the  domestic  defense  industry  has  all  
chances  to  become  the locomotive of the country’s industrial, scientific and technological 
development gives new horizons for discussing the most appropriate rearmament strategy. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The relevance of the topic is determined by several factors. Firstly – the global 
processes in the sphere of industry. Over the past few years, significant institutional 
changes have occured in the world industries that previously generally referred to 
state property and state administration: electric power, road, rail, and municipal 
services, trunk pipeline transport, ports, airports, etc. Governments transfer objects 
of these industries for temporary long- and medium-term business use, while 
retaining the right to regulate and control their activities. 
 
Secondly - modern realities in the development of the military and industrial 
complex (hereinafter MIC) in Russia pose such tasks, which require new or 
adaptation of existing financial, economic and organizational mechanisms. Among 
the most important tasks are the prompt import substitution of technologies that 
were still supplied from abroad; the development of new ones, as well as the 
modernization of existing weapons and military equipment, both in order to increase 
the country's defense capability, and in order to implement agreements in the 
framework of military-technical cooperation. 
 
Not just the tasks, but also the conditions for the development of the MIC are 
substantially changing. The sluggish growth of the global economy and the 
implementation of Western sanctions against Russia hinder the growth of GDP and 
budget revenues. Control over the use of budget funds is being tightened. At the 
same time, since private companies occupy the dominant positions in industry, as 
well as in the economy as a whole, it becomes possible and expedient in certain 
cases to use extrabudgetary financing and public-private partnership mechanisms 
(hereinafter PPP) for the implementation of defense industry projects. Moreover, the 
simplification of the process of creating new production facilities in the defense 
industry, including through the use of PPP mechanisms, is one of the important areas 
of the Russian Government activities, which should be realized in accordance with 
Presidential Decree of May 7, 2012 No. 603 “On the implementation of plans 
construction and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other 
troops, military units and bodies and modernization of the military-industrial 
complex.” With the proper choice of a PPP model, the correct organization of the 
project and qualified expert support while using these mechanisms will allow to 
share financial and technological risks, to combine the strengths and competencies 
of partners on a long-term basis. 
 
There is still little experience in implementing PPP projects in Russia, although quite 
a solid regulatory framework has already been outworked in the civilian sectors of 
economy. Sufficient for the use of public-private partnership mechanisms is the 
legal regulation of the status of public entities as participants in PPPs, as well as the 
regulation of contractual forms of PPPs. It is done a lot in the development of the 
regulatory framework related to intellectual property management. In 2017 in first 
reading of the State Dume the draft federal law on the Foundations of Public-Private 
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Partnerships in the Russian Federation was adopted. A large set of concession 
regulations has been developed for various sectors of the economy (with the 
exception of the defense industry). 
 
The authors of the article suppose, the country has basically already developed the 
conditions for the use of PPP mechanisms previously tested in other sectors of the 
economy in some specific projects of the military-industrial complex. And this can 
be done without waiting until the law "On Public-Private Partnership in the Field of 
Military-Technical Support of the Defense and National Security" has finally passed 
all the necessary stages of approval in the Federal Duma. It seems that the 
implementation of projects in the defense industry is possible with minor changes 
and additions to the existing regulatory framework for PPP. 
 
2. Russian Public and Private Sector as a Component of National 
Rearmament Program 
 
Currently, the cooperation between the defense industry and private business in 
Russia is mainly implemented in two ways - in the form of a state contract and 
privatization. This is obviously not enough. There are a number of constraints to its 
expansion, the main of which are economic ones (Samarin, 2014). 
 
Today, the average profitability of enterprises of the Russian defense industry is 
lower than its level in industry as a whole. Therefore, the economic interest of 
private business in cooperation with the state in the defense industry is still small. 
The organization of effective interaction between the Russian defense industry 
complex (MIC) and private business is currently an extremely important task. Its 
relevance is due not only to the need to create a well-equipped Armed Forces that 
fully meets modern global challenges, but also to the need to restore the rhythmic 
and dynamic functioning of one of the most important sectors of the Russian 
economy, which in previous decades actually became a hostage to market reforms. 
 
In August 2012, the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin identified one of 
the most important conditions for development of the MIC to improve the 
mechanisms of public-private partnership. For this, a Council at the Military 
Industrial Commission was created. It included more than 100 business 
representatives, as well as government agencies. Their work is built and divided into 
10 groups by directions. To date, detailed Council work programs for each of the 
groups have been adopted. The concept of applying public-private partnership 
mechanisms in the military-industrial complex has already been approved. The 
purpose of its development was to determine the direction and ways of providing in 
the long run until 2020. the use of public-private partnerships in the military-
industrial complex in the interests of creating and producing a new generation of 
weapons, military and special equipment (Glybin, 2014). 
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The main focus is supposed to be on the development of a new modern regulatory 
framework governing the main directions of the application of public-private 
partnership mechanisms in the MIC, in particular, the extension of the scope of the 
draft Federal Law "On Public-Private Partnership in the Russian Federation". The 
government approved the draft of this law; it is currently under consideration by the 
State Duma. As many experts believe, without this it is not possible to effectively 
attract private investment. 
 
Another area is an analysis of the regulatory and control and oversight functions of 
state authorities in relation to developers and manufacturers of defense industry 
products. Also – stimulation the availability of information in its open part, 
especially in the format of open data, about the needs of the military-industrial 
complex for new products and state order for the long term. The Ministry of Defense 
and the Military-Industrial Commission are conducting serious work in this direction 
(Vorushilin et al., 2014) 
 
And, finally, ensuring proper monitoring the effectiveness of spending on the 
implementation of the state defense order. The Council adopted the concept of the 
PPP mechanisms application in the MIC, which was developed jointly with the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, approved by the members of the Council, and will 
be built on the basis of practical application of this concept. Work is underway on a 
draft procedure for the creation of weapons and special equipment at the expense of 
organizations and investors of the private sector on an initiative basis. At the 
moment, the corresponding regulation does not exist, therefore, initiative 
developments, in essence, remained outside the legal field. 
 
According to experts, the main problems of public-private partnership in the 
military-industrial complex are: licensing (it takes a lot of time and resources); 
access for R&D use by companies with private capital; the ability to access the 
training grounds for testing new equipment. Also the need for the availability of 
capital for the creation of new industries is noted, the guarantee of a state order, 
which should be valid for more than 10 years, and the resolution of the issue of 
intellectual property rights and development are bieng criticized (Shishkov, 2015). 
 
The main tasks that the Council sets for itself at the military-industrial commission 
are the following: to improve the regulatory framework and to develop cooperation 
and attraction of private companies at the second level of cooperation - at the level 
of sub-contracts. This could be a serious tool to reduce costs. Maximizing direct 
support to pilot projects for the creation and production of new prototypes that are 
produced with the participation of private capital. And there are already some 
successful examples. In particular, the experience in creating armored vehicles by 
the Basel group, the new small arms - ORSIS and Strizh. 
 
According to V.G. Varnavsky (2010), the following main forms of PPP are used in 
the Russian Federation: 
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• government contracts with investment obligations; 
• participation in capital; 
• concession agreements (concessions); 
• production sharing agreements; 
• contracts combining various types of work and property relations. 
 
Involvement of inefficiently used lands in the economic turnover may also give 
additional turn to the MIC development. The defense industry is the largest land 
holder throughout the country. However, these land resources are not fully used for 
their own needs, and some of them are potentially attractive for business 
development. In addition, legislative restrictions do not allow using them not only 
for civilian needs, but also for organizing the production of the defense industry. 
 
Table 1. The most promising spheres of PPP in the field of defense and security3 
Directions/ 
forms  
Military 
Infrastructure 
«Fighter 
Infrastructure» 
Military and 
technical support 
Life cycle 
contracts 
- construction and using 
of objects and structures 
for the Ministry of 
Defense 
- Creation / 
modernization with 
subsequent operation of 
communication 
facilities and troops 
management.  
construction and 
using of objects 
and structures in 
the interests of the 
Ministry of 
Defense 
- introduction of new 
technologies and 
projects 
- mass production 
and maintenance 
(with disposal) 
ВВСТ 
-  modernization and 
maintenance ВВСТ  
Concession 
agreements 
construction and using 
of objects and structures 
in the interests of the 
Ministry of Defense 
construction and 
using of objects 
and structures in 
the interests of the 
Ministry of 
Defense 
organization of mass 
production and 
service ВВСТ  
Joint 
industries 
("project 
companies") 
creation of enterprises 
performing the 
functions of supporting 
the activities of the 
Ministry of Defense 
creation of 
enterprises 
performing the 
functions of 
organizing the life 
and social security 
of the Armed 
Forces 
- implementation of 
individual projects 
and designs ВВСТ 
-  organization of 
production and 
service ВВСТ 
- resource supply of 
the MIC enterprises   
 
 
3 Compiled by the authors on the basis of Chistov, 2012 
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3. Practical Implementation of the Rearmament Program in Russia and     
the USA: A Comparative Analysis 
 
One of the main achievements of the Russian Navy in recent years has been the 
adoption of the “Caliber” cruise missiles. Their effective use in Syria, including their 
launching from small missile ships (SMS), was a big shock for the West. However, 
now, with the dissolution of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (here and 
after – IRNFT), the very existence of NCSs with “Caliber” as part of the Russian 
Navy should be called into question.  
 
The IRNFT at one time put an end to the development of several classes of weapons 
in the USA and the USSR – ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles with a range 
of 500 to 5500 kilometers. The United States eliminated “Pershing-2” ballistic 
missiles and “Griffon” ground-based cruise missiles – the ground version of the 
“Tomahawk”. The USSR eliminated three types of medium-range ballistic missiles, 
two types of shorter-range ballistic missiles, and the Griffon counterpart, the RK-55 
“Relief” missile system, which was a ground-based version of the S-10 “Garnet” 
system. The launcher of the “Relief” complex mounted on a high-cross-country 
automobile chassis was equipped with six missiles. 
 
At the same time, the IRNFT did not cover sea-based cruise missiles. As a result, the 
United States, which has already begun the mass introduction of “Tomahawk” cruise 
missiles and Mk41 vertical launch vehicles in its Navy, got the opportunity to deploy 
such missiles in unlimited numbers on ships and submarines. 
 
Today, the United States possesses thousands of such missiles, which even in non-
nuclear combat equipment pose a huge danger to any country, including Russia. 
Calculations show that the United States can easily and without mobilizing reserves 
deploy a couple of formations (having both aircraft carriers and missile ships with 
submarines) at sea, each of which will have approximately a thousand such missiles 
in readiness for immediate launch, in addition to hundreds of deck-based combat 
airplanes. 
 
For a long time, the Russian Navy did not attach any importance to getting such 
shock capabilities. And this despite the fact that the OKB "Novator" (an organization 
formed on the basis of the developer S-10 "Garnet" and RK-55 "Relief" – SMKB 
"Novator") was able to maintain the scientific and technical backlog obtained during 
the creation of the RK "Garnet" , and the navy had a substantial number of carriers 
of such weapons – submarines of 971 project  "Shchuka-B". The Navy would not 
have required any significant expenses, except for the completion of the 
development of the non-nuclear Garnet that had begun earlier and the minimal 
modernization of submarines. But the fleet was not interested in this project in the 
90-s. 
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It was so uninteresting that in the mid-2000s the first two carriers of the new 
“Caliber” complex (projects 671RTM and 877), created on the basis of the “Garnet” 
backlog, were decommissioned. Project 971 “Shchuka-B” was also withdrawn from 
combat, the issue of upgrading the third generation of submarines was actually 
thwarted4. Non-nuclear variants of the "Garnet" did not find its’ niche in the fleet. 
Development work on the new “Caliber” complex was provided by the Navy with 
huge underfunding, although there was always interest in the system in the Ministry 
of Defense itself, but not in the Navy. 
 
However, subsequently there was a chain of events, which were initially unrelated to 
each other, which nevertheless caused the appearance of long-range cruise missiles 
in the arsenal of the fleet, albeit in an extremely irrational way. 
 
The first circumstance that changed the situation with cruise missiles was the critical 
situation with the defense industry enterprises financing, in which export was the 
salvation of the problem. The response of an individual “Novator” design bureau to 
this challenge was the emergence of the “Club” missile family – export missiles with 
a relatively short range, created using the backbone of the non-nuclear “Garnet”. The 
missiles turned out successful both in the shock (against the coast), and in the anti-
ship variants. 
 
An order soon followed – the Indian Navy ordered in Russia a series of Talwar-class 
frigates of 11356 project, staffed with the “Club” complex missiles in the installation 
of the vertical launcher for eight missiles. The first of these ships was laid down at 
the Baltic Shipyard in March 1999. Also, export submarines began to receive the 
missile system. The installation of the “Club” complex on a 636 Project submarine 
(and their mass export series) became a “breath of oxygen” for Russian submarine 
shipbuilding. But they were made for export at that time. 
 
The situation was paradoxical. While foreign buyers systematically armed their ships 
with Russian cruise missiles, the domestic fleet had nothing of the kind and did not 
plan to have it. As a result, abnormality of this situation was strictly criticized at a 
special meeting in Kremlin by the Russian President V.V. Putin in 2006 – with 
tough conclusions regarding the Navy. 
As a result, the Navy rushed to complete the development works and put the 
"Caliber" on any suitable new ships. The first was the Rocket Ship "Dagestan" – 
completion with the modernization of the previously laid down ship with the 
deployment of the “Caliber” missile weapons complex on it. The results of the 
Zelenodolsk Design Bureau forcing the completion of 11661 Project under the 
“Caliber” missile system became the basis for the deep modernization of the 21630 
Project small artillery ship (SAS) into the small missile ship (SMS) of 21631 Project  
“Buyan-M”. 
 
 
4 Compiled by the authors on the basis of oruzhie.info. 
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In May 2010, a tender was held to determine the contractor for the construction of a 
series of new small missile ship (SMS). The tender was won by the Zelenodolsk 
shipyard5. Already in August 2010, the first specialized carrier of such missiles was 
launched – it was the “Grad Sviyazhsk” ship. The combat use of these ships in 2015 
was successful and shocked observers in the West. But behind this success was the 
fact that the entire missile salvo of the Caspian flotilla was and remains many times 
less than that of any modern US-destroyer. 
 
4. Crucial Strategic Difference Between the Russian and the American 
Attitude Towards NAVY Tasks 
 
The "land logic" laid down in the design of this ship is striking. It is actually a 
floating rocket battery. “Buyan-M” has no opportunity to detect either a submarine 
or detect the launch of its torpedoes. The project has inherent problems with attacks 
on surface targets – own target designation system lacks. The ship has extremely 
weak air defense, cannot boast of either speed or seaworthiness. The interbase 
transition of such ships to the Baltic Fleet was very difficult: both for the crew and 
with significant restrictions on the use of the “Caliber” missile system. 
 
Having received these “floating batteries”, the Navy, in view of the critical situation 
with the naval staff, began to use them as full-fledged ships. For example, SMSs of 
the “Buyan-M” project are constantly located in the Mediterranean Sea (actually 
mostly located in the port of Tartus). It is precisely there that these ships do not have 
significant combat value, solving the problem of actually displaying the flag. In the 
Mediterranean, such a ship is just a target. 
 
The key problem of the chosen path for the “calibration” of the Navy is its high cost 
combined with a small number of deployed cruise missiles. At the same time, the 
April 14, 2018 strike on Syria by the U.S. Navy and its allies showed that modern 
missiles can effectively get off - and the question of creating powerful (effective) 
missile salvos is very acute. Unfortunately even the entire Black Sea Fleet salvo of 
the “Caliber” missile complex is smaller than the missile salvo of one modernized 
destroyer "Spruence" of the US Navy (all have already been decommissioned, there 
can be no discussion of comparison with the newer ships of Arly Burke-class). 
 
In the framework of “naval thinking” (as opposed to “land”), cruise missiles must be 
placed on multi-functional ships capable of “moving out” the launch line into the far 
sea zone and from there reaching targets in places that the enemy considers safe. On 
ships capable of independently using special launchers for launching anti-ship 
missiles on enemy surface ships, and for launching anti-submarine missiles on 
detected submarines. Russia has built and keeps building such ships-frigates of 
22350 project and corvettes of 20385 project. Cruise missiles and the latest series of 
“Varshavyanka” 636 submarines project can be used. SMSs of 21631 project are 
 
5 Compiled by the authors on the basis of Russian Military Industries List, 2018. 
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created in a completely different paradigm – it is simply a substitute for the once 
banned by IRNFT ground launchers. 
 
From the economic point of view it is a very expensive substitution. In 2016-2017 
prices one such ship costs nine billion rubles – almost half of the corvette 20385. 
Only the corvette has incomparably greater combat capabilities and can operate 
independently. Foreign diesel engines are partly to blame for such a price – SMSs 
are designed for four German MTU engines. Later, these engines came under 
sanctions, and now Chinese diesel engines manufactured by Henan Diesel Engine 
Industry Ltd., which required a long and serious revision, are now being put on all 
ships under construction. 
 
Unlike the USA, Russia has unfortunately missed the opportunity to quickly 
modernize the ships of the military due to the deployment of the “Caliber”-type 
missiles in inclined launchers (for example, the modified standard projectile 
launchers KT-100 project 1155). Instead, the ships either remained “bare” or went 
under an extremely costly upgrade with the installation of a vertical launch launcher 
(as it was implemented on the Big Antisubmarine Ship “Shaposhnikov”). 
 
Another option for the quick and effective Navy “calibration” was the modernization 
of 1234 Project SMSs by equipping them with the “Caliber” complex in the already 
mentioned inclined launchers. Taking into account the experience in creating the 
1234.7 missile launcher with twelve “Onyx” anti-ship missiles, it should be assumed 
that up to sixteen “Caliber” missiles can be deployed, which, combined with the air 
defense system and artillery, makes such missile defense systems very powerful 
carriers (more than twice the size of the project 21631 missile systems). They are 
also able to attack surface targets. But instead of that, 1234 SMSs were rearmed of 
the “Uran” Missile Complex, which seriously limits their combat capabilities. 
 
Having accumulated negative experience with the “Buyan-M”, the Navy initiated the 
creation of a series of other small missile ships – 22800 “Karakurt” project. New 
ships were a reaction to the problems of the old ones, without assessing how justified 
a specialized ship was for the fleet at all. “Karakurt” was provided with greater 
speed and better seaworthiness, they received a target designation complex, with the 
installation of the “Pantsir-M” complex, air defense was sharply strengthened. The 
ship was created in the shortest possible time: the lead “Karakurt” was built faster 
than even the lead small missile ship of 1234 Project in the USSR! 
 
After the start of the construction of “Karakurt”, it turned out that there was no 
enterprise capable of building the engines for them – the main producer of domestic 
high-speed marine diesel engines, the shipyard Zvezda from St. Petersburg, was 
unable to produce the required amount of diesel engines. Even several built ships of 
this class will stand at the outbuilding walls for several years, waiting for their main 
power plants. Not until question of their “hearts” (Main Power Plants, MPP) reached 
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the level of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief again, were the necessary decisions 
made to accelerate the production of their diesel engines6. 
 
But finally the fate of floating batteries was put “in question” by none other than 
Donald Trump. The US withdrawal from the IRNFT completely deprives the missile 
floating batteries of meaning – the same missile, but with a ground launch, can now 
be placed on a ground launcher. And it is much more profitable. The double-battery 
division of operational-tactical missile system Iskander costs about six billion rubles 
and provides the same eight-missile salvo. SMSs cost nine billion in 2017. But 
SMSs, firing rockets, must return to the base, which still needs to be protected from 
air strikes. Ground launcher is recharged in place, with the help of transport-loading 
machine. 
 
Thus, in fact, for six billion Russia receives not eight, but 16 missiles in a salvo in a 
short time. By adding extra missile ammunition, you can increase this amount even 
more. And if we return to the standard Relief launcher (on the same Minsk MZKT 
chassis), we get six missiles in the installation, twelve in the battery and twenty-four 
in the division, plus reserve of transport-loading machine. The price is almost the 
same as for one SMS, which has only eight missiles. 
 
And if you scale the costs ten times, then instead of eighty cruise missiles in a salvo 
of ten RTOs, you can get up to two hundred and forty for the same money if you use 
the “Relief” complex launcher. And it is possible quickly to design a launcher like 
the old soviet “Molodetz”, indistinguishable from the usual civilian road train 
neither from the satellite, nor from the reflected radar signal, nor into night optics 
from several kilometers. 
 
Such machines will also provide more salvo than a multiple launch vehicle and will 
also be cheaper. In addition, ground-based launchers can be dispersed, masked in 
forests, and shelter underground. Yes, and to protect them from air strikes is much 
easier, because they can stand in the rear, while SMSs are always at sea – at the 
forefront. 
 
Russia certainly needs a powerful fleet. Sea-based cruise missiles are also needed, 
and it is quite possible and necessary to arm full-fledged warships and submarines 
with them. But the continuation of the construction of small missile ships in the 
existing form is the throwing of state money to the wind, which after the abolition of 
the IRNFT makes absolutely no sense. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
What should be done in the practical sense? First of all – to stop the construction of 
this class of ships. Second – to return to the inclined launchers (along with vertical 
 
6 Compiled by the authors on the basis of  Russian State Armament Program, 2015. 
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ones on new ships) for mass modernization of large naval warships. This does not 
negate the fact that vertical launch installations can also be installed on modernized 
ships, in case it is impossible to be done in any other way. Third, to modernize all 
submarines with a significant remaining service life for the use of “Caliber” missile 
complex. Fourth, to ensure the use of the complex on new types of warships, which 
will be built for the Navy in the future (corvettes, frigates). It's time to think about 
more rational ways of spending the money allocated for the fleet. While 
implementing the greatest rearmament in its history, Russian Federation cannot 
allow building disused floating rocket batteries. 
 
In the sphere of PPP the measures seem to be the following. Obviously, it is 
advisable to combine the positive aspects of the two approaches - competition 
inherent in private business, and long-term public administration. Moreover, the 
state itself must constantly take care of creating an effective competitive 
environment as a factor in dynamic development. Therefore, the organization of 
effective interaction between the Russian defense industry and private business is 
currently an important state task. Its relevance is due not only to the need to create a 
well-equipped Armed Forces that fully meets modern global challenges, but also to 
the need to restore the rhythmic and dynamic functioning of one of the most 
important sectors of the Russian economy, which, through the development and 
subsequent replication of new promising technologies, can become the driver of the 
mechanical engineering development. The development of the defense industry will 
give impetus to engineering, the chemical industry, and information technologies.  
 
Thus,  the  state’s  financial   and   economic   policy   in   the   field   of   defense  
and modernization  of  the  domestic  defense  industry  has  all  chances  to  become  
the locomotiveof the country’s industrial,scientific and technological development as 
a wholein themedium term, provided that the priorities that are correctly chosen are 
maintained (Martynenko and Parkhitko, 2018). 
 
So far, private business has been reluctant to become a partner in large companies in 
the production of military hardware, since, along with the low profitability of the 
defense industry, until recently, there was a practice where the Ministry of Defense 
made adjustments to the already approved state order. Therefore, it was extremely 
difficult for little profitability enterprises, not having guaranteed long-term orders, to 
be interested in roduction cooperation. 
 
The development of cooperation between business and the MIC at the state level 
should go along the path of creating conditions for public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) - a set of organizational, legal, financial and economic relations and joint 
actions of the state and private business aimed at achieving the goals of the state 
economic policy in order to address socially significant tasks on mutually beneficial 
conditions. This form of economic and business development, such as PPPs, has 
been widely developed abroad. All the leading manufacturers of military equipment 
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in the USA are non-state, however, the participation and influence of the state in 
their activities is quite large. 
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